The Simple Duality: Humean Passions

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1. Introduction

Hume views the passions as having both intentionality and qualitative character – that is, he views the passions as having both a directedness and also a phenomenological feel. At the same time, he holds that the passions are simple impressions, which is to say that they ‘admit of no distinction nor separation’ (THN 2.2.1.1). However, reconciling these views is problematic in light of his Separability Principle (THN 1.1.7.3), which states that anything distinguishable is separable by the thought and imagination. Since the intentionality and qualitative character of the passions are distinguishable, these qualities are therefore separable; thus the passions possess separable qualities, and so admit of separation. This result seemingly contradicts their simplicity, leading to an interpretive puzzle.

I examine the dominant solution to this puzzle of claiming that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions (Ardal 1989, Cohon 1994, Cohon and Owen 1997, Garrett 2006, Schmitter 2008); according to this view, the passions may extrinsically possess intentionality while being intrinsically simple. I argue that despite the initial plausibility of this solution, a number of Hume’s claims regarding the intentionality of the passions (pride and humility in particular) provide reasons for thinking an intrinsic account of the intentionality of the passions to be required. But how can passions be both intrinsically qualitative and intentional, and yet be simple? I propose to resolve this tension by appealing to Hume’s treatment of the ‘distinctions of reason’, as explained by Garrett (1997). By

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1 In the references to Hume’s texts throughout, ‘THN’ refers to the Treatise of Human Nature, ‘EHU’ refers to the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and ‘DP’ refers to the Dissertation on the Passions. Arabic numerals refer to section and paragraph numbers (EHU and DP), or to book, part, section, and paragraph numbers (THN).
treating the distinction between a passion’s intentionality and its qualitative character as a distinction of reason, I argue that simple passions may possess both these qualities intrinsically without compromising the Separability Principle. Specific instantiations of intentionality and qualitative character within a single passion are neither distinguishable, nor separable (allowing for the simplicity of the passion); nevertheless, the abstract ideas of intentionality and qualitative character are both distinguishable and separable (which explains how we can differentiate these two qualities).

2. The Duality of the Passions

Let me briefly clarify some terminology. Roughly, the qualitative character of a passion is the pure phenomenological feel the passion has, that is, its ‘what-it-is-like-ness’ or experiential aspect. The intentionality of a passion is its directedness – my anger at John is directed at John, for example.\(^2\) Note that I do not suppose that intentionality implies a two-place relation; for instance, an intentional mental entity might fail to refer. My claim is that some Humean passions possess both these qualities.\(^3\)

Humean passions undeniably and uncontroversially possess qualitative character, as they are impressions of reflection (THN 1.1.2.1; THN 1.1.6.1; THN 2.1.1.1). For Hume, impressions are the building blocks of experience, and must therefore be experiential in nature; indeed, Hume notes that the distinction between impressions and ideas is in effect the

\(^2\) I prefer the term ‘intentionality’ to ‘intentional content’, because the latter carries a connotation of literally having a part that bears an intentional payload. This might be what is involved in possessing intentionality, but it need not be (and I later argue that it is not with respect to the passions); therefore, I use the more innocent ‘intentionality’ to avoid this unnecessary connotation.

\(^3\) Not all passions have intentionality – for example, a general anxiety, or a cheerful mood. Hume does not seem to have a ready-made distinction that would divide the passions into the intentional and non-intentional (e.g. the direct/indirect distinction would not work, because there are intentional passions that are indirect [pride] and direct [desire]). In any case, the problem I set out in this paper only applies to the passions that are intentional.
difference between *feeling* and thinking (THN 1.1.1.1). And with regard to pride and humility, Hume takes ‘their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul’ – that is, their qualitative characters – to ‘constitute their very being and essence’.

There is also a strong textual case for Humean passions possessing intentionality, as Hume repeatedly emphasises this point in Book 2 of the *Treatise* (although infamously, THN 2.3.3.5 is often thought to deny this point – see below). Hume says of pride and humility:

‘Tis evident, that pride and humility, tho’ directly contrary, have yet the same OBJECT. This object is self… (THN 2.1.2.2)

In order to excite pride, there are always two objects we must contemplate, *viz.* the cause or that object which produces pleasure; and self, *which is the real object of the passion*. (THN 2.1.6.5, emphasis added)

Their ‘object’ (or ‘real object’) is their *intentional object*, that is, the object ‘to which they direct their view’:

We must, therefore, make a distinction betwixt the cause and the object of these passions; betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that to which they direct their view, when excited. Pride and humility, being once rais’d, immediately turn our attention to ourself, and regard that as their ultimate and final object… (THN 2.1.2.4)

Likewise, Hume recognises the directedness of other passions:

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4 This characterisation might be misleading, since ideas also have qualitative characters, being fainter copies of our impressions. What Hume means is that because impressions are more vivacious, their felt vivacity is more forceful than that of ideas.

5 ‘Sensation’ is used by Hume to refer both to impressions of sensation, and to qualitative characters. In THN 2.1.5.4, Hume means by ‘sensations’ the qualititative characters of the passions, rather than impressions of sensation. These passions are simple and admit of no constituent parts, and so Hume cannot be referring to constituent *impressions* in speaking of the ‘sensations’ of the passions. Here ‘sensations’ has to refer to the qualitative aspect of the passions, rather than perceptions in their own right. See also THN 2.1.5.9, THN 2.2.1.3, THN 2.2.1.6 and THN 2.2.2.3.

6 Cohon (2008) notes that Hume seems to equivocate between holding objects and the ideas of these objects as the intentional objects of the passions. I believe that, properly speaking, the intentional objects of the passions are the objects themselves rather than the ideas of them – Hume probably speaks loosely in speaking of ideas of objects as intentional objects, because we can only conceive of objects through our idea of them.
As the immediate object of pride and humility is self... so the object of love and hatred is some other person... (THN 2.2.1.2)

... the objects of contrary passions are presented at once... (THN 2.3.9.13)

... the principal object of the passion [of fear], *viz.* the life or death of his friend... (THN 2.3.9.27)

Such statements abound in Book 2, making clear that Hume recognises that at least some passions are intentional. Indeed, Hume’s categorisation of the passions into ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ seems to commit him to the view that the passions typically have intentionality: “indirect” passions that are marked by the possession of objects that are not simply identical to their causes, while “direct passions” do not divide between their causes and their objects.

It should be noted that I take directed passions to be intentional, but not representational. As I see it, representationality is a subset of intentionality – all representational things have intentionality, but the reverse is not true. Hume thinks representation requires both resemblance to (THN 1.4.5.3) and causal derivation from (THN 1.2.3.11) the represented entity. In general, resemblance and causal derivation amount to the copy relation; of course, we can represent objects we have never been acquainted with (such as Timbuktu) and so representation can also occur with inexact resemblance to the object and a more convoluted causal chain leading back to the object (for example, my idea of Timbuktu is causally derived from a description in a novel, which in turn is causally derived from Timbuktu).  

Clearly, to represent something is to be directed at or be about it in some way, and therefore representationality entails intentionality. However, intentionality does not entail representationality: in itself, the notion of directedness does not imply the notions of resemblance and causal derivation.

7 Thanks to Amy Schmitter for much helpful discussion on this matter.
As mentioned earlier, some interpreters deny Hume’s commitment to the intentionality of the passions on the basis of the following infamous passage:

A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possessed with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos’d by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider’d as copies, with those objects, which they represent. (THN 2.3.3.5)

What may be a natural reading of this passage leaves some commentators incredibly unimpressed with Hume. Penelhum (1993, p.128) describes this passage as a ‘wildly implausible denial of the intentionality of the passions’; Baier (1991, p.160) calls it ‘one very silly paragraph’ that contradicts Hume’s general account of the passions, which emphasises their intentional objects; Fogelin (1985, p.113) describes it as a ‘disaster’.

I think a careful reading of the passage renders a more plausible interpretation, particularly if we are careful to separate the notions of representation and intentionality. Hume is not here denying that the passions are intentional, rather, he is making the more modest claim that they are not representational. In THN 2.3.3.5 Hume wishes to argue that passions cannot ‘be contradictory to truth and reason’, as such a ‘contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider’d as copies’ of ‘those objects, which they represent’. Hume only needs the additional premise that the passions are not copies – that is, representations – for his argument to go through; he need not deny the obvious truth that they are intentional, as such a claim would be superfluous for his purposes once he denies that the passions contain ‘any representative quality’.
One might object to this reading that we cannot distinguish representation from intentionality; the claim is that to be intentional towards X, a mental state must represent X. However, I find it gratuitous to assume that intentionality requires representationality, since in itself, the notion of directedness does not imply anything about resemblance and causal derivation. Perhaps the fact that an intentional passion will typically be accompanied by an idea of its intentional object could be taken as evidence for intentionality implying representationality. However, it does not follow that a passion is representational simply because it is accompanied by an idea of its intentional object; rather, it seems that it is the idea that is bearing the representational burden in such a situation, leaving it open that the passion is non-representational, despite being intentional.

More difficult to accommodate is Hume’s claim in the passage above that anger ‘makes no reference to any other object’; prima facie, this certainly reads like a rejection of anger’s intentionality. Nevertheless, it is plausible to read Hume here as awkwardly making the less controversial point that anger (and the passions more generally) are non-representational. Cohon (1994, p.189) argues that this line merely denies that impressions ‘stand for’ things in the manner that ideas do, i.e. by being copies of them; Hume’s point is simply that passions are non-representational. Cohon points out that this reading coheres well with Hume’s claim that ‘a passion is an original existence’, thus containing ‘no representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification’. Since no rejection of the intentionality of the passions would follow from the arguments of this passage, and since Hume does not require such a strong to conclude that the passions are not truth-apt, it is certainly very plausible to read his description of anger as merely stating the non-representationality of anger in a rather awkward and misleading fashion. Sayre-McCord (1997), Schmidt (2003, p.174), Alanen (2005, p.127), and Schmitter (2008, p.230) read this passage similarly, as merely denying that the passions represent; Baillie (2000, p.84-6)
likewise thinks that Hume here only denies the truth-evaluability of the passions.\textsuperscript{8} All in all, it seems that there is a case to be made for Humean passions being both intentional and qualitative in nature, despite THN 2.3.3.5 superficially seeming to suggest otherwise.

3. The Simplicity of the Passions

The dual nature of the passions is problematic for Hume given their simplicity:

The passions of PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and uniform impressions, 'tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, \textit{or indeed any of the passions}. (THN 2.1.2.1, emphasis mine)

'TIS altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions of \textit{love} and \textit{hatred}; and that because they produce merely a simple impression, without any mixture or composition. (THN 2.2.1.1)

For Hume, simple impressions are those that ‘admit of no distinction nor separation’ (THN 1.1.1.2). This seems to be in tension with the fact that Humean passions have both intentionality and qualitative character: how can a simple, uniform impression possibly have two such different qualities? The clearest way to highlight the problem here is by applying Hume’s Separability Principle:

We have observ’d, that whatever objects are different are distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination. (THN 1.1.7.3)

We are able to distinguish the intentionality of the passions from their qualitative character, and therefore the two are separable; thus the passions that possess them cannot be simple, as simple impressions ‘admit of no distinction or separation’. In what follows, I examine

\textsuperscript{8} Weller (2002, p.201) also denies that THN 2.3.3.5 claims the non-intentionality of the passions, thinking it to deny them ‘assertoric character’ instead; however, he assumes that intentionality requires representational content, which I denied earlier. It is particularly difficult to see how Weller would reconcile such an account of intentionality with the simplicity of the passions; he attempts to do so by claiming that Hume only means that the phenomenological feel of the passions is simple (p.226), but this seems a strained reading to me.
‘extrinsic’ accounts that attempt to rescue Hume from this seeming inconsistency by claiming that the intentionality of the passions is merely an extrinsic quality.⁹

4. Extrinsic Intentionality

One common way to reconcile the apparent duality of the passions with their simplicity is to claim that intentionality is an extrinsic property of the passions; the passions are intrinsically simple and wholly qualitative, but possess intentionality in virtue of their extrinsic relations. Ardal (1989) argues that passions are intentional in virtue of their causal link to an idea of their intentional object, while Cohon (1994, p.190) claims that pride is intentional in virtue of reliably turning one’s attention to the idea of self. Similarly, Schmitter (2008) suggests that the passion of pride attains intentionality through its role in drawing our attention to the idea of its intentional object by virtue of its various causal relations to the idea. In the same spirit are Cohon and Owen (1997), who propose that directed passions are intentional in virtue of being associated with ideas that do the required representing. Garrett (2006) holds much the same view:

…Hume does not deny that representation is involved in having passions; he claims only that the passion itself is a non-representational impression of reflection, while the representational content involved in the passion’s being of, at, or for someone or something is provided by one or more associated ideas. (Garrett 2006, p.303)

Although the details differ, these accounts agree that the passions possess intentionality only when their structure of extrinsic relations is considered holistically; intrinsically, however, the passions are purely affective and qualitative.

⁹ One option in resolving this puzzle is simply to take Hume’s position to be inconsistent as it stands. Merivale (2009) indeed sees Hume’s account of the passions as being problematic in the Treatise, although for different reasons concerning the double relation of impressions and ideas. At least for the problem I highlight in this paper, I think that there are sufficient materials in the Treatise to avoid attributing such an inconsistency to Hume.
I think that extrinsic accounts ultimately fail to capture something crucial in Hume’s treatment of the intentionality of the passions. I give three reasons for this, using pride and humility as exemplary passions: first, they cannot account for pride and humility’s being essentially directed towards the self; second, they contradict Hume’s claim that the intentionality of pride and humility is an original quality; third, Hume seems to see the intentionality of pride and humility as a quality *in the passions* (rather than an extraneous quality of them).

a) Pride and Humility’s Essential Directedness Towards the Self

The first problem is that, according to extrinsic accounts of intentionality, the passions are only contingently directed at to their intentional objects; however, pride and humility seem to be *essentially* directed at their intentional objects. Note that pride and humility cause the idea of the self, and so are contingently related to the *idea of self*; this is to be distinguished from pride and humility being essentially directed at the *self*. Cohon (1994) thinks this objection anachronistic:

Twentieth century theorists think the connection of pride with oneself is a logical, not a causal one, known a priori and not a posteriori. But Hume need not have believed this even though we do. (Cohon 1994, p.191)

However, Hume himself seems to recognise the essentiality of this relation; he notes that it is ‘absolutely impossible’ that pride and humility should have an object other than the self, or ‘lose sight of this object’ (THN 2.1.5.3). He also describes the intentionality of pride and humility towards the self as the ‘distinguishing characteristic’ of these passions, which suggests that this property is a necessary condition for a passion to count as pride or humility:

*Tis always self, which is the object of pride and humility; and whenever the passions look beyond, ’tis still with a view to ourselves, nor can any person or object otherwise have any influence upon
us. That this proceeds from an original quality or primary impulse, will likewise appear evident, if we consider that 'tis the distinguishing characteristic of these passions. (THN 2.1.3.2-3, boldface added)

Hume also claims that a passion would not count as pride or humility without being directed towards the self:

When the self enters not into the consideration, there is no room either for pride or humility. (THN 2.1.2.2)

This essentiality is even more clearly emphasised in the Dissertation:

… it is essential to pride to turn our view on ourselves with complacency and satisfaction. (DP 2.4, emphasis mine)

Some of these quotations can admittedly be read causally, but the modal reading is also supported by the inconceivability of pride and humility having an object other than the self. If it were merely contingent that pride has the self for an object, then it seems likely that we could conceive of pride as directed at someone else. Thus, the inconceivability of pride’s not being directed at the self renders it very likely that this is impossible, that is, that pride is essentially related to its intentional object, the self. Extrinsic accounts of intentionality fail to accommodate this fact, as the relation between pride and the self would

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10 For instance, Hume does use ‘absolute impossibility’ in a causal rather than modal sense in EHU 10.27; nevertheless, DP 2.4 in particular seems difficult for a causal reading to accommodate

11 Hume’s official formulations of the Conceivability Principle (THN 1.1.7.6, THN 1.2.2.8) only explicitly state that conceivability entails possibility rather than that inconceivability entails impossibility, although he notoriously takes himself to be applying the Conceivability Principle when he claims that inconceivability entails impossibility: ’Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible…. We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as impossible’ (THN 1.2.2.8, boldface added).

12 In correspondence, Don Garrett argues that pride and humility are only contingently directed at the self, but their causal connection is so deeply entrenched that it takes on a semblance of necessity. It seems unlikely that any causal connection, no matter how deeply entrenched, could render us incapable of conceiving that it not hold; the causal observation that the sun rises every morning is extremely entrenched, yet its negation is clearly no less conceivable for this. The impossibility of conceiving of pride as not directed at the self therefore strongly suggests that this connection is necessary.
have to obtain via the three associative principles of resemblance, contiguity, and causation, which are the only general principles that can unite our thoughts:¹³

These principles of connexion or association we have reduced to three, namely, Resemblance, Contiguity, and Causation; which are the only bonds, that unite our thoughts together... (EHU 5.14)

...the only general principles, which associate ideas, are resemblance, contiguity and causation. (THN 1.3.6.13)

Importantly, these relations are contingent – invoking the Separability Principle, we can distinguish and therefore separate any two resembling/contiguous/causally related entities, and thus any such relation would have to be contingent. For pride’s directedness at the self to be essential, it seems that its intentionality must be intrinsic.

In response to this objection, there are a few defensive manoeuvres extrinsic accounts could make. For instance, it might be maintained that extrinsic accounts of intentionality are able to accommodate pride and humility being essentially directed at the self, because this essentiality falls out of the definition of pride. Davidson (1976, p.755) and Radcliffe (2006, p.364-5) argue that pride is to be defined as a certain sensation standing in particular causal relations; pride is necessarily directed at the self, despite the fact that such a relation is merely causal. However, it is debatable whether this is a satisfactory account of pride. For one, it would render Hume’s claim in THN 2.1.2.4 that pride causes the idea of self completely trivial. Furthermore, such an analysis of pride seems to contradict Hume’s claim that the passions are indefinable (THN 2.1.2.1), as pride would then be definable as a pleasurable sensation causally related to the idea of oneself. Once we add a non-impressionistic condition

¹³ Hume does note in THN 1.3.6.13 that these principles are ‘not the sole causes’ of united ideas, but maintains that they are ‘the only general principles, which associate ideas’. Extrinsic accounts of intentionality need to appeal to general principles, given that they aspire to provide an account of how passions are systematically intentional by means of their extrinsic relations; to postulate a different extrinsic relation as the source of intentionality for each passion would be extremely ad hoc.
to the concept of pride, it would no longer be definitionally simple, but rather definable in terms of this condition along with the impressionistic element; on the other hand, if pride consisted solely in the impressionistic element (without any other criteria), it would be indefinable because it would consist only of a single indefinable element.\(^{14}\) These two objections cast doubt on Hume’s holding a stipulative account of pride’s causality.

Alternatively, it might be objected that Hume could not hold that pride is essentially directed at the self, because his psychological atomism precludes necessary relations between perceptions and other objects (THN 1.4.5.5). However, pride’s being essentially directed at the self does not in itself entail the existence of the self (recall that I do not suppose that intentionality implies a two-place relation), and therefore this essential directedness does not constitute a necessary relation between the two. Compare with the case of hallucination: plausibly, my non-veridical perceptual experience of a floating dagger is essentially one of a floating dagger (if it were of something else, it would be a different experience), but nevertheless this experience does not entail the existence of any such floating dagger. Similarly, the fact that pride is essentially directed at the self does not entail the existence of self.\(^{15}\)

Neither does it logically entail the existence of an idea of the self. Since pride is a simple perception, it ought to be able to exist alone. Indeed, since pride can be distinguished from the idea of the self, the two are therefore separable. However, pride’s intentionality does contingently cause the idea of the self via the associative principle of resemblance between intentionalities, which Hume recognises as a genuine associative relation: ‘the parallel

\(^{14}\) It might be objected that even if pride contained a non-impressionistic element, its impressionistic element (that is, the pleasurable sensation) is itself unanalysable and indefinable, and therefore pride would be unanalysable and indefinable. However, the indefinability of an element of the definition of pride does not entail the indefinability of pride itself: the fact that a concept X is defined in terms of indefinable elements does not entail that X is indefinable; indeed, quite the contrary! Of course, as an empiricist Hume believes that all ideas are ultimately reducible to indefinable experiences, but this certainly does not entail that no ideas are definable.

\(^{15}\) Pride might entail the existence of the self for other (arguably non-logical) reasons, for instance because of cogito-style arguments, but its being essentially directed at the self is not one of these reasons.
direction of the desires is a real relation, and no less than a resemblance in their sensation, produces a connexion among them’ (THN 2.2.11.3). The point is that both the passion of pride and the idea of self share the same intentional object (i.e., the self); this ‘parallel direction’ of the two perceptions can be associated by the associative principle of resemblance and thus produce a connection between them. Take my desire for a particular slice of cake: its intentionality resembles the intentionality of an idea of that same slice of cake, as they are both directed at the same object; this resemblance of intentionalities causes the desire to draw the mind to its corresponding idea. Similarly, pride is intentionally directed at the self, thus causing the idea of the self (THN 2.1.2.4) due to the associative principle of resemblance between their intentionality. Pride’s essential directedness at the self therefore does not entail the idea of the self necessarily, but only causally, and is perfectly consistent with Hume’s psychological atomism, while still accounting for how intentional passions systematically cause the idea of their intentional object.

b) Intentionality as an Original Quality

The second and most serious worry is that Hume clearly takes the intentionality of pride and humility to be an original quality:

'Tis evident in the first place, that these passions [of pride and humility] are determin’d to have self for their object, not only by a natural but also by an original property. (THN 2.1.3.2)

First, I find, that the peculiar object of pride and humility is determin’d by an original and natural instinct, and that 'tis absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that these passions shou’d ever look beyond self... For this I pretend not to give any reason; but consider such a peculiar direction of the thought as an original quality. (THN 2.1.5.3)

16 That being said, I think that the direction of a passion is not truly distinct from its sensation. I later argue that intentionality is merely an aspect of qualitative character; to say that two perceptions resemble with respect to their intentionality is simply to say that they resemble with respect to an aspect of their qualitative characters.

17 Later, I will argue that ideas and impressions have different forms of intentionality. Nevertheless, it is possible for these different forms of intentionality to resemble in virtue of their object and their directedness.
From THN 2.1.5.3, Hume seems to be using ‘original’ to refer to those phenomena or principles for which we are unable to give further explanation (‘any reason’). An interpretive question here is what forms of explanation are meant to be ruled out by originality. There are, of course, various forms of explanation: one can explain something by adducing additional causal connections (e.g., the tree fell because it was struck by lightning), or by resolving it into more general principles (e.g., bright lights produce heat because one form of energy is converted into the other). One plausible reading is that originality only rules out explanation by means of adducing additional causal explanations. Another plausible reading is that originality rules out any further form of explanation at all, whether by means of adducing additional causal connections, or by means of resolution into more general principles; original principles are explanatorily basic. I argue that Hume uses ‘original’ in the second sense.

The first reading of ‘originality’ gains some strength the following passages, where Hume considers certain principles and phenomena original because of our inability to provide additional causal explanations:

[The three principles of association’s] effects are every where conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be resolv’d into original qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain. (THN 1.1.4.6)

Nothing is more curiously enquir’d after by the mind of man, than the causes of every phaenomenon; nor are we content with knowing the immediate causes, but push on our enquiries, till we arrive at the original and ultimate principle. (THN 1.4.7.5)

…we must despair of explaining its [the feeling of belief’s] causes, and must consider it as an original principle of the human mind. (THN App 3)

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18 Another form of explanation is conceptual analysis, but I bracket it because it does not explicitly crop up in the Hume’s discussions of originality.

19 Thanks to Amy Schmitter for pressing me on this point.
Hume also uses originality to rule out explanation by resolution into more general principles, suggesting that he uses ‘original’ in the *strong* sense of ruling out any further form of explanation, whether by resolution into more general principles or by adducing additional causal explanations. Consider the following:

There are, however, instances, in cases of less moment, wherein this immediate taste or sentiment produces our approbation. Wit, and a certain easy and disengag’d behaviour, are qualities *immediately agreeable* to others, and command their love and esteem. Some of these qualities produce satisfaction in others by particular *original* principles of human nature, which cannot be accounted for: Others may be resolv’d into principles, which are more general. (THN 3.3.1.27)

Hume’s explanation for why some principles do not count as original is that they ‘may be resolv’d into principles, which are more *general*’ (emphasis added). Note that this has nothing to do with being able to give additional *causal* connections, as another causal connection would not count as a ‘more general’ principle, but only an explanation of the same order of generality. The reason Hume cites for this lack of originality is our inability to resolve these principles into more general principles, which points to a wider notion of originality than in the first alternative. Similarly with EHU 1.2:

… proceeding from particular instances to general principles, [the abstruse philosophers] still push on their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded. (EHU 1.2)

Here, Hume is discussing how abstruse philosophers reduce particular instances to more and more general principles; the reason Hume cites for the originality of ultimate principles is that one cannot subsume them under ‘principles more general’. In short, Hume seems to use ‘original’ in the *strong* sense of ruling out any further form of explanation, whether by adducing additional causal connections or by resolution into of more general principles. And
indeed, THN 2.1.3.3 certainly implies that pride and humility’s intentionality towards the self is irresolvable into other principles:

Now these qualities, which we must consider as original, are such as are most inseparable from the soul, and can be resolv’d into no other: And such is the quality, which determines the object of pride and humility. (THN 2.1.3.3)

But extrinsic accounts cannot understand the intentionality of pride and humility to be original in this strong sense. Extrinsic accounts have the consequence that the intentionality of the passions would be resolvable into more general principles, viz. the three principles of association, which are the only general principles that can unite our perceptions (EHU 5.14; THN 1.3.6.13). Whether explaining intentionality in terms of a causal nexus that draws the mind to the idea of the self (Cohon 1994, Schmitter 2008), or in terms of a causal connection with an intentional idea (Cohon and Owen 1997, Garrett 2006), these accounts explain pride and humility’s intentionality in terms of more general associative principles, and thus seem to violate its claim to originality.

For this reason, extrinsic accounts of intentionality are untenable. But if an account held pride and humility to be intrinsically intentional, it could accommodate the originality of these passions.

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20 It might nevertheless be argued that, even if the above extrinsic accounts fail, there might be some extrinsic account that escapes this objection by claiming that, the three principles of association are meant by Hume only to associate ideas with ideas, as they unite our thoughts; this leaves it open that intentionality might be a sui generis irreducible associative relation that associates ideas with impressions. However, Hume clearly does not think that the three principles of association are limited to associations between ideas: causation associates a present impression with an idea (THN 1.3.8.7); resemblance associates impressions with impressions (THN 2.1.4.2); and resemblance also associates impressions with ideas, as in the case of triggered memories (for example, he notes that ‘a picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original’ in EHU 3.3). Thanks to Don Garrett for raising this objection.

21 Even if the intentionality of this attached idea is itself irresolvable into more general principles (which I later rule out in Section 5a by arguing that ideas gain intentionality via causal derivation and resemblance), nevertheless the intentionality of the passions remains perfectly explicable in terms of an association with an intentional idea, as we could explain the ‘original property’ of pride and humility’s intentionality by pointing to the causal relation between these passions and the idea of self.
c) **Intentionality as a Quality in the Passions**

Extrinsic accounts of intentionality are also directly compromised by the fact that Hume seems to suggest that the intentionalities of pride and humility are qualities *intrinsic* to these passions:

> First, I find, that the peculiar object of pride and humility is determin’d by an original and natural instinct, and that ’tis absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that these passions shou’d ever look beyond self, or that individual person, of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious. Here at last the view always rests, when we are actuated by either of these passions; nor we, in that situation of mind, ever lose sight of this object. For this I pretend not to give any reason; but consider such a peculiar direction of the thought as an original quality.

The *second* quality, **which I discover in these passions**, and which I likewise consider as an original quality, is their sensations...’ (THN 2.1.5.3, boldface added)

Here Hume refers to the sensations of pride and humility as the second quality that he discovers *in these passions* – this surely indicates that the first quality of intentionality is also one that he discovers ‘in these passions’: that is, intentionality is an intrinsic rather than an extrinsic quality of the passions.  

All in all, the three objections detailed in this section provide pressing reasons to think that extrinsic accounts of the intentionality of the passions leave out something important in Hume's discussions of this intentionality, and motivates the need for an intrinsic account. Intrinsic accounts do have the consequence that the directedness of a passion is logically distinct from its causing the idea of its intentional object, and thus these two are potentially separable. However, intentionality does almost always *contingently* cause the idea of the intentional object through the resemblance of intentionalities, as previously noted in Section

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22 Merivale (2009, p.199) disagrees, holding that the intentionality of the passions is a property of the mind rather than the passions, but this is difficult to reconcile with Hume’s phrasing above.
4a. Psychological laws are just set up in such a way that an intentional passion almost always brings to mind the idea of its represented object; just as bodies intrinsically possess mass, which contingently exert gravitational force, passions intrinsically possess intentionality, which contingently exerts associational force.

5. **Intrinsic Intentionality**

However, intrinsic accounts of the intentionality of the passions have problems of their own. The two major objections are as follows: first, the original problem of how a simple passion may intrinsically possess both qualitative character and intentionality seems to loom unresolved; second, the fact that Hume takes the intentionality of ideas to be an extrinsic quality suggests that the same is true of the intentionality of the passions. Here, I will address both these worries, starting with the second.

**a) Ideas as Extrinsically Intentional**

Examine the following:

> But to form the idea of an object, and to form an idea simply is the same thing; the reference of the idea to an object being an extraneous denomination, of which in itself it bears no mark or character. (THN 1.1.7.6)

Here Hume claims that ‘the reference of the idea to an object’ is ‘an extraneous denomination, of which in itself it bears no mark or character’. An idea has intentionality just because it makes reference to an object; so if the latter is extrinsic, the whole intentionality of ideas is correspondingly extrinsic. But one might then presume that the passions have the same sort of intentionality: extrinsic.
However, we should be careful to distinguish the intentionality of ideas from that of the passions. Ideas are, of course, intentional in virtue of being *representational*; Hume’s statement in this passage only establishes that representation is an extrinsic quality. It is silent on the nature of other forms of intentionality. Passions, of course, do not represent (as emphasised in THN 2.3.3.5); they possess a different *kind* of intentionality, one which may be intrinsic to them. For this reason, Hume’s claim that ideas are extrinsically intentional need not apply to the passions: certain forms of intentionality may be extrinsic (such as the representation performed by ideas), and other forms may be intrinsic (such as the sort of primitive directedness possessed by the passions).

The drawing of such a distinction is further substantiated by the fact that Hume makes claims regarding the intentionality of the passions that he does not make for the intentionality of ideas. As mentioned earlier, Hume thinks that the intentionality of pride and humility is an essential (THN 2.1.3.2; THN 2.1.2.2; DP 2.4) and original quality (THN 2.1.3.2; THN 2.1.3.3; THN 2.1.5.3). Moreover, it is found in *the passions* (THN 2.1.5.3). Hume makes no equivalent claims regarding the intentionality of ideas; he never claims that the intentionality of ideas is an essential or original quality, nor that he finds it in ideas. It is therefore plausible that passion-intentionality may be different in kind from extrinsic idea-intentionality.

Indeed, even extrinsic theories of passion-intentionality must distinguish between passion-intentionality and idea-intentionality. Such accounts maintain that passions possess intentionality in virtue of various extrinsic relations to intentional ideas, but the same explanation cannot hold true for ideas: ideas cannot derive their intentionality by being extrinsically related to other intentional ideas, on pain of a vicious regress. Therefore, it seems that all parties agree that we have good reason to distinguish idea-intentionality from passion-intentionality; thus, my invoking such a distinction can hardly be thought *ad hoc*. 
b) Reconciling Simplicity with Duality

There remains the question we began with: how can a simple passion be both intentional and qualitative? To resolve this puzzle, I turn to Hume’s discussion of the distinctions of reason, as explained by Garrett (1997). The ‘distinctions of reason’ seem to present a counterexample to Hume’s Separability Principle:

The difficulty of explaining this distinction arises from the principle above-explain’d, *that all ideas, which are different, are separable*. For it follows from thence, that if the figure be different from the body, their ideas must be separable as well as distinguishable; if they not be different, their ideas can neither be separable nor distinguishable. What then is meant by a distinction of reason, since it implies neither a difference nor a separation? (THN 1.1.7.17)

Figure and body\(^23\) are distinguishable but not separable, which seems a straightforward violation of Hume’s Separability Principle. Garrett reads Hume as resolving this worry by emphasising that body and figure are abstract ideas, whereby Humean abstract ideas are determinate ideas of particular instances that achieve general signification because of their disposition to revive the custom to bring to mind ideas of other particular instances that resemble them in the suitable respects (in Garrett’s terminology, these resembling ideas constitute the ‘revival sets’ for the corresponding abstract ideas). We can indeed distinguish between the abstract ideas of figure and body, but this is merely a distinction between classes of perceptions, which are both separable and distinguishable. However, the specific instances of figure and body within a single object are inseparable from each other, and indeed are indistinguishable. Thus, the distinctions of reason do not provide a counterexample to Hume’s Separability Principle.

\(^{23}\) Other distinctions of reason according to Hume are between motion and the body moved, and between figure and colour.
This framework allows us to solve our problem of attributing both intrinsic intentionality and qualitative character to simple passions by treating these two qualities as merely a distinction of reason. The abstract ideas of intrinsic intentionality and qualitative character are both distinguishable and separable, since these sets are not coextensive: the revival set for the qualitative character of sorrow at somebody’s misfortunes would be the set of perceptions resembling in virtue of their phenomenological feel, and could include various kinds of melancholy not directed at such bad luck. But in thinking about the intentionality of the passion, the revival set is the set of perceptions that resemble each other by virtue of their being directed at the same object; such perceptions might include exasperation or malice for the unlucky person. These two sets are clearly distinguishable and separable. However, we can neither distinguish nor separate the intrinsic intentionality of a particular passion from its qualitative character. They are the same thing, just as the particular instance of the whiteness of the globe is nothing other than the particular instance of the figure of the same globe.

This framework resolves the theoretical inconsistency between a passion’s intrinsic intentionality and its qualitative character, but it may leave us uncertain about the nature of this intrinsic intentionality? On the view I am espousing, intrinsic intentionality is *constitutively determined* by qualitative character. To put this point another way, the intrinsic directedness of a passion is just an inseparable aspect of its feeling, and intrinsic intentionality is essentially a *qualitative* phenomenon – for a passion to be intrinsically intentional is simply for it to have a particular sort of feeling. Introspection may bear this out. Try to distinguish the sensation of a particular directed passion of anger at a friend from its directedness in a specific instance: it seems that this anger’s qualitative character is itself

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24 I borrow the phrase ‘constitutively determined’ from Horgan and Tienson (2002). In allowing for a kind of intentionality constitutively determined by qualitative character, I follow proponents of ‘phenomenal intentionality’ such as Horgan and Tienson (2002); Loar (2003); and Horgan, Tienson and Graham (2004). My account is most similar to that proposed by Peter Goldie, who combines the feeling and intentionality of emotions. See for example Goldie (2002).
what possesses directedness, just in virtue of being at your friend. Anger’s directedness is not a distinct component apart from its qualitative character, but is simply part and parcel of its particular feel, the quality of which is is inherently directed a certain way. Plausibly, we cannot have a qualitatively indistinguishable passion with a different intrinsic intentionality – a different direction would entail a different phenomenology of this passion, as its directedness is simply part of the feeling of the passion. Thus, the simplicity of the passions does not come under threat, allowing us to maintain the intuitive Humean position that passions are purely qualitative entities – their intentionality comes ‘for free’, because it is inseparable from their qualitative characters.

This account provides the resources to make sense of Hume’s claims about the intentionality of the passions. First, pride and humility are essentially directed at their objects: their qualitative character is the ‘being and essence’ of these passions (THN 2.1.5.4), but since their intrinsic intentionality is constituted by their qualitative character, this intentionality is likewise essential to these passions. Secondly, the intrinsic intentionality of the passions is an original quality. Qualitative character cannot be resolved into general principles, nor can we adduce causal explanations for it. Since it is an aspect of qualitative character, intrinsic intentionality is also original. And thirdly, this form of intentionality is found in the passions, because its qualitative nature makes it an intrinsic property of the

25 In correspondence, Amy Schmitter describes this position as holding that intentionality is ‘a sizzling arrow of feeling’.
26 Note that this account of passion-intentionality entails that all intentional passions are essentially directed at their particular intentional objects: a particular anger at James would not be the same passion of anger if it was not at James, for example. Pride and humility are unique in that all passions of pride and humility are essentially directed at the self that possesses them.
27 Chalmers (1995) calls the question of how and why we have qualitative experience the ‘hard problem of consciousness’; the difficulty of explaining qualitative character might explain why Hume thought it to escape explanation by analysis.
passions. Thus the above account makes sense of all of Hume’s potentially problematic claims examined in Section 4.\textsuperscript{28}

5. Concluding Thoughts: Multiple Senses of Intentionality

I hoped to have shown the plausibility of Humean passions being both intrinsically intentional and qualitative. There remain interesting questions about the multiple senses of intentionality in Hume brought out in this paper.\textsuperscript{29} I have argued that there is reason to think Hume holds that the passions possess intrinsic intentionality: pride and humility are essentially directed at the self; their intentionality is an original quality; and their directedness is a quality he discovered \textit{in} these passions. But of course, there are other senses of intentionality that come out in Hume’s framework. In Section 5b, I argued that Hume thinks ideas have an extrinsic form of intentionality, that is, \textit{representation}. Moreover, given that passions can also cause the ideas of their objects (e.g., the double relation of impressions and ideas), they might also be said to possess yet another (non-representational) form of extrinsic intentionality; thus, my account of the intrinsic intentionality of the passions is consistent with a variety of extrinsic accounts of the intentionality of the passions, such as Ardal (1989), Cohon (1994), Cohon and Owen (1997), Garrett (2006) and Schmitter (2008). The crucial point of my paper is not that such extrinsic accounts are wrong in themselves, but that they fail to capture a crucial form of intrinsic intentionality that Hume is concerned with. An account of intrinsic intentionality is required to make sense of a variety of Hume’s claims about the intentionality of the passions.

\textsuperscript{28} Note that having multiple resemblances does not entail complexity. Hume is clear that resemblance need does not require sharing qualitatively identical elements; he points out in an Appendix note to THN 1.1.7 that simple perceptions can have multiple resemblances, as in the case of the resemblance between simple perceptions of green and blue, and the resemblance of simplicity between simple perceptions (THN App 5). For some problems with Hume’s view, see Baxter (2011). However, Baxter’s objections do not apply to Garrett’s framework above, as for him talk of ‘points of resemblance’ are just proxies for speaking of sharing resemblance classes.

\textsuperscript{29} Thanks to Amy Schmitter for pushing me on this point, and helping me clarify my thoughts on the matter.
Let me end with a final question: is the picture of intrinsic intentionality I paint sufficiently rich to capture what we think is important to intentionality? I think it is. The most important aspect of the intentionality of the passions is of course the directedness itself, and intrinsic intentionality delivers this. Intrinsic intentionality also manages to account for the notion of the passions having a ‘world-to-mind’ direction of fit: it is simply part of the nature of a passion that it should aim to make the world conform to it, because its feeling (that is, its ‘very being and essence’ [THN 2.1.5.4]) is simply directed at an aspect of the world that ought to conform to it. What intrinsic intentionality does not deliver is any holistic connection to other mental states, but perhaps extrinsic intentionality may fill this role. The crucial point is that intrinsic intentionality is intentionality is a fully-fledged sense, and it is also a form of intentionality that Hume recognises in the passions.30

References


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